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Working Draft  
22 Nov 61

### NRO Functions and Responsibilities

The following discussion provides a basis for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the NRO for satellite reconnaissance, to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and most effectively utilized.

The attached chart represents a project-by-project examination of the key functions and responsibilities as now constituted, together with suggested changes to achieve the desired unified and workable NRO functional structure. The letters in parentheses represent change.

The major functional areas are first discussed below as they should ultimately should be, after which exceptions are identified which may occur during the transition period leading to the final desired organization. This discussion is considered to be consistent with all the pertinent directives, agreements, and memoranda relating to the NRO and NRP.

1. Management. The management aspects have been broken into two major divisions: technical and financial.

NRO and USAF

review(s) completed

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a. The technical management responsibility for all projects (black and white) should be ultimately vested in SAFUS. Specific technical responsibilities for each project should, in the final solution, be the sole responsibility of the Secretary and he should be responsible to 5412.

(1) The Air Force should generate the appropriate directives to transfer the total technical responsibility for the ARGON, MURAL and Navy programs to the Air Force. Since there are only two more shots and one unassigned payload in the CORONA program, no change should be made in the present technical management structure of that program.

(2) It should be clearly understood that assignment of the technical management responsibility to SAFUS in no way is intended to exclude the participation of the Agency. There should be established a very small technical control unit, similar to the configuration control board, with membership composed of the particular Air Force project director, a SAFMS representative and an Agency representative. Such a unit would act to assure maximum flow of information as well as provide a degree of active participation in each project from the NRO. In each case this group would be chaired by the Air Force project director, thereby pinpointing responsibility.

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(3) For the area of electronic signal collection it is necessary that the Agency immediately designate an individual with a prime responsibility to represent the Agency in the technical control units for signal collection projects. A firm liaison channel between the NRO and NSA will be required either as an adjunct to, or as a part of such a unit. Planning should encompass maximum utilization of the Navy technical resources to support the electronic signal collection programs.

b. The financial management area has been separated into two further divisions: funds and contracts.

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2. Security. The total security for the National Reconnaissance Program should be administered in accordance with the rules and regulations laid down by the [redacted] manual. The implementation of this manual should be the responsibility of the CIA. The CIA security officer should have as a deputy an Air Force officer assigned to the NRO (physically located in SAFMS). The Deputy should be responsible for compliance with the manual throughout all of DOD. On a project-by-project basis, the administration of the security systems should be the responsibility of the CIA, with the Deputy Security Officer administering the system for all personnel within DOD, through control officers in the JCS, Army, Air Force, and Navy staffs, and the NSA. For the collection programs, final need-to-know validation authority should become a responsibility of SAFUS, except for contractor or government personnel

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cleared personally by Mr. Bissell. For products, the final need-to-know validation authority should be the Agency. The need-to-know responsibility for CORONA, ARGON, MURAL and the Navy program should remain as currently constituted until a detailed phasing program from the existing security system on a project-by-project basis can be worked out by the Director and Deputy Director of Security for the NRO.

3. Operations.

a. Scheduling. The launch schedule for all satellite reconnaissance efforts should be the sole responsibility of SAFUS. The CIA would hold all black contracts on major subsystems and would have scheduling responsibilities to SAFUS in this regard. However, SAFUS would have the sole ~~xx~~ NRO responsibility for overall schedules.

b. Targeting. The existing capability for preparing computer programs to get coverage of specific targets will require ~~xx~~ reorganization.

(1) A CIA member of the NRO should be designated as chairman of a target selection group which would have tri-service representation on a full-time basis. The target selection group should have available the schedules and technical capabilities of all of the ~~sxxesxx~~ sensor systems, and the complete coverage obtained by all sensor systems. This group, having established the pre-launch targeting selection, would transmit this information to a yet-to-be-established

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operations control room at the STC for satellite missions (and to designated operations points for other missions.) This operations control room would be the control for all satellite reconnaissance missions, responding to operational decisions from Washington, engineering decisions from the project director.

(2) The officer in charge of the operations control room at the STC would be sole responsible agent to assure necessary actions with the bird as well as with the ground environment to maximize the probability of satisfying the coverage of given targets established by the target selection group.

(3) To provide retargeting subsequent to launch, there should be in the Washington area (either at H Street or CIA new Hq building (one place only)) a comprehensive display so that the targeting group can monitor each mission and make decisions based on operational factors, i. e., weather, target coverage, change in situation due to missed orbit, political situation, or new intelligence data. The decision as to which targets to cover would be made by the targeting group and would be based on information from this display in the Washington area. IN a similar manner, operational decisions based on engineering factors could be provided by sources external to the STC control room. Responsibility for both the pre- and post-launch targeting responsibility would rest with the CIA, who would provide the chairman of the Agency-Tri-Service Targeting Group.

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(4) The on-orbit operation of each individual bird should be the responsibility of SAFUS. Any required functions relating to on-orbit vehicle and payload operation, [redacted] orbit changes, filters, etc., would be the sole responsibility of the officer in charge of the control room.

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(5) The CORONA program should be excepted from the above considerations, since the program is nearly over. All other satellite reconnaissance should be changed to conform to the above pattern as soon as possible.

(6) There is not now defined, within the CIA, a signal intelligence targeting capability in the sense described above. The

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same degree of precision planning as is required for photographic missions. Therefore, there must be established a signal intelligence targeting group which would effect close liaison with NSA in the accomplishment of its targeting functions.

c. Recovery. Recovery as here used includes all types of data retrieval, i. e., either physical recovery or readout. There are two aspects which influence recovery: the operational aspect and the engineering aspect.

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(1) Operational decisions as to the initiation of recovery (coverage, weather, etc.) should be the responsibility of the Joint Targeting Group and hence under the Agency.

(2) Engineering decisions relating to the capability for successful recovery, or if recovery should be attempted at all, should be the sole responsibility of SAFUS, as executed at the STC Control Room. Recovery as related to the existing Navy program is now administered wholly by the Navy and NSA. This should not be changed through the end of that program.

d. Formatting. The formatting of the collected product falls into two distinct types: photographic and signal intelligence.

(1) Photographic formatting includes the initial chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the user. The initial chemical processing should be the responsibility of the CIA for all satellite photographic systems. The production for all users (for all photographic satellite collection systems) should be the responsibility of SAFUS. The CORONA program should remain the complete responsibility of the CIA since there are only two more CORONA flights.

(2) In the area of the signal collection systems the formatting responsibility should remain with SAFUS for [redacted] whereas formatting for the Navy program should remain with NSA and the Navy, through the end of that program.

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
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
e. Engineering Analysis. Engineering feedback from operating systems is required to correct the problems that exist on the operating system as well as to provide information for new systems. Since the SAFS would be responsible for the technical management of all satellite collection systems, the Secretary should also be responsible for the engineering analysis of all satellite collection systems, with participation by the CIA. The configuration control board concept (the Technical Control Unit) could be used for both technical decisions regarding program as well as for engineering analysis, thereby keeping all parties appropriately informed and utilizing the technical capabilities of the interested agencies. The CORONA program and the Navy program would be exceptions, since the CORONA program only has two more flights and the Navy program extends only through CY 62. However, the Air Force should be recognized as a full participant for the engineering analysis of the Navy program.



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5. To utilize the peculiar capabilities of the various organizations it is proposed that an Army-Air Force-Navy representative be assigned to the CIA/NRO for the specific purpose of doing all operational target planning. In addition, ~~it~~ the Army could directly contribute to the mapping and geodesy area by assigning to the NRO one or two qualified officers for mapping and geodesy. In addition, the Navy could provide one or two individuals for assignment to the NRO in connection with the

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assigned to the SAFSP/NRO field extension under Gen Greer, or to the CIA/NRO in Washington.

6. The responsibility for advanced plans (post CY 62) for all

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satellite reconnaissance projects should be assigned to the Director, SAFSP/NRO. To assure the most efficient utilization of current capabilities and flexibility, as well as advanced plans, the CIA should assign contract, legal, communications, security, and planning personnel to the Director, SAFSP/NRO.

7. The USIB would establish or validate all requirements for the NRP and establish broad project and overall target priorities. However, they would not determine schedules, or determine targets for particular ~~xx~~ missions. COMOR would not be involved with the NRO or NRP, except as required, to advise USIB in the determination of NRP requirements and broad priorities. Selection of targets and target decisions during conduct of missions would be made by the joint targeting group previously described.

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